By Navneet Lounsberry
In May 2026, Verizon published the nineteenth edition of its Data Breach Investigations Report. For the first time in the report's history, stolen credentials lost the top spot as the leading initial access vector. Vulnerability exploitation climbed to 31 percent. Credential abuse dropped to 13 percent, down from 22 percent the year before.
I watched that finding travel through the market in about a week. Vendors repositioned. Analysts wrote it up. And somewhere in a budget review, a finance leader pulled up the headline and asked a reasonable question: if identity attacks are falling, why does the identity program need more money this year?
The security team in that room knows the answer. Verizon tracked credential abuse across the full breach chain, not just the front door, and found it present in 39 percent of breaches. The report also introduced a new pretexting category that absorbed some of what previously counted as credential abuse. The headline describes first contact. The 39 percent describes what attackers actually do once they arrive.
Knowing that answer and delivering it are two different skills. Most security teams have the first one. Fewer have the second. That gap explains more stalled identity programs than any technical shortcoming I have seen across twenty years of enterprise selling.
Why does identity security lose the budget conversation?
Identity security loses budget conversations because practitioners describe risk in architectural terms while executives allocate money in consequence terms. The technical description is correct. It simply does not answer the question the person holding the budget is actually asking.
A security architect says the organization runs password hash synchronization with a single Entra Connect server that sits outside the Tier 0 management boundary. Every word of that carries meaning. None of it tells a CFO what breaks, what it costs, or what happens if the company does nothing for another year.
This is not a communication failure in the soft sense. It is a translation failure with a measurable price. Programs that never get funded never reduce risk, and the exposure compounds quietly while the architecture documentation gets more accurate every quarter.
The identity bridge shows the problem clearly
The clearest example I know sits in almost every large hybrid environment: the connection between on-premises Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID.
What is the identity bridge?
The identity bridge refers to the components that link on-premises identity to cloud identity. In most Microsoft environments that means Entra Connect synchronization servers, pass-through authentication agents, and Active Directory Federation Services where organizations still run federation.
Microsoft does not treat these components casually. Its own documentation classifies Entra Connect servers, AD FS, Entra application proxy, and Active Directory Certificate Services as Control Plane assets, the tier formerly called Tier 0, alongside domain controllers themselves. Microsoft recommends restricting administrative access to these servers to tightly controlled groups, denying NTLM authentication to the Entra Connect server, and hardening the platform to the same standard applied to the directory it serves.
The reasoning is direct. Entra Connect holds privileged access to both sides. It reads objects from Active Directory using a connector account and writes synchronized objects into Entra ID using a dedicated service account. In password hash synchronization deployments it reads Kerberos hash material from the directory. Anyone who controls that server controls the credentials of every synchronized account.
Why do attackers target the identity bridge?
Attackers target the bridge because compromising it converts a local foothold into complete access across both environments, and because the resulting access looks legitimate.
Golden SAML illustrates this better than any other technique. CyberArk Labs first described the attack in 2017. An attacker who obtains the private key of an AD FS token-signing certificate can forge authentication assertions for any user, in any role, against any application that trusts that federation service. The forged token validates correctly against the public key. Multifactor authentication does not apply, because no authentication actually occurs. Conditional Access policies do not apply for the same reason. The relying party cannot readily distinguish the forged assertion from a genuine one.
This is not theoretical. The threat actor behind the SolarWinds intrusion used exactly this technique in the wild, compromising SAML signing certificates and minting valid tokens to reach hosted resources including email. Mandiant documented the technique in further detail in 2021, and its researchers recently found that manual certificate rotation can silently leave active signing keys recoverable from Machine DPAPI, meaning organizations that believed they had rotated remained exposed.
Read that sequence carefully. An attacker who reaches one server bypasses every identity control the organization purchased, and does it in a way that generates authentic-looking activity.
Why does the bridge stay underfunded?
Here is where the commercial problem shows up. The technical case for protecting the identity bridge is overwhelming and publicly documented by the vendor itself. The work still does not get funded, for four reasons that have nothing to do with architecture.
- Nobody senior owns it. The sync server usually belongs to a Windows infrastructure team that reports through IT operations, not security. It sits between two org charts and appears fully in neither.
- No compliance framework names it. Auditors ask about MFA, access reviews, and privileged accounts. Few ask whether the synchronization server carries a Control Plane hardening standard, so the finding never appears on the remediation list that drives spending.
- It never fails loudly. A misconfigured firewall causes an outage. An underprotected sync server runs perfectly for years, right up until it does not.
- It has no business name. Executives fund things they can name. "Entra Connect hardening" is not something a board member can repeat to a peer.
That last point matters most. Budget follows narrative, and the identity bridge arrives without one.
How do you translate identity risk into business language?
Translation is a discipline, not a personality trait. Three moves do most of the work.
Name the consequence, not the mechanism
Executives do not need to understand token forgery. They need to understand what an attacker gains and what the organization loses.
Compare two descriptions of the same risk. The first: an attacker with administrative access to the AD FS server can extract the token-signing certificate and forge SAML assertions that bypass Conditional Access. The second: one compromised server lets an attacker log in as our CFO, from anywhere, without a password, and our multifactor investment does not stop it.
Both statements are true. Only one of them ends with someone asking what it would take to fix.
I want to be precise about what this is not. Translation does not mean simplifying until the claim stops being accurate, and it does not mean reaching for fear. Buyers eventually catch overstated risk, and the credibility loss outlasts the deal by years. The goal is to state the real consequence in the vocabulary of the person deciding.
Attach the risk to something leadership already funds
Unnamed risk competes badly. Risk attached to a funded priority competes well.
Nearly every enterprise currently runs a cloud migration, an ERP program, a merger integration, or a compliance deadline with executive attention behind it. The identity bridge sits underneath all of them. A migration that synchronizes identities into a cloud tenant depends entirely on the integrity of that synchronization. A defense contractor working toward CMMC assessment cannot demonstrate access control over systems where a single server undermines every access decision.
Framing the work as protecting an initiative the organization already committed to does something a standalone security request cannot. It moves the conversation from new spending to protecting existing spending, and those two conversations have very different success rates. I wrote about a related version of this dynamic in CMMC in the Plant, Not the PowerPoint, where compliance programs succeed or fail based on whether they touch operational reality.
Offer the smallest credible first step
Large identity programs stall because they ask for a decision proportional to their scope. Executives approve things they can reverse.
A hardening assessment of three servers is a decision someone can make in a single meeting. A three-year identity governance transformation requires a steering committee, a business case, and a budget cycle. The first one creates evidence that makes the second one easier to approve later.
This sequencing is not a sales technique. It reflects how organizations genuinely absorb change, and practitioners who understand it get more of their work funded than practitioners who insist on the complete program up front.
What buyers actually say when identity risk stalls
Certain objections repeat across industries. Each one signals a specific gap.
When a buyer says they already deployed MFA, they believe they solved the identity problem. They have not heard that token forgery and session theft operate downstream of authentication entirely.
When a buyer says they cannot explain this to their board, they are asking for language, not information. That request deserves a direct answer rather than more technical detail.
When a buyer says the sync server belongs to another team, they have identified an ownership gap that will block the work regardless of how strong the technical case becomes. Somebody has to resolve that before anything else moves.
When a buyer says nothing has happened yet, they are applying the reasonable heuristic that quiet systems are healthy systems. The identity bridge is specifically the place where that heuristic fails, and saying so plainly tends to land.
What this means for commercial teams in cybersecurity
I have spent my career on the commercial side of enterprise technology, at IBM, SAP, Manhattan Associates, UKG, and most recently in identity and access management consulting. The pattern I keep returning to is this: technical depth and commercial effectiveness are not competing skills, and the strongest people in identity security refuse to choose between them.
The sellers who consistently win complex identity deals do not win because they know more about Kerberos than their competitors. They win because they can hold an architecture conversation with a security engineer at nine in the morning and a consequence conversation with a CFO at two in the afternoon, without changing the underlying facts between those two meetings.
That second conversation is where most identity programs live or die, and it receives a fraction of the preparation the first one gets. For anyone building a career in this market, the translation skill compounds faster than any product certification.
That translation skill sits alongside the rest of the commercial toolkit. Full Throttle Media covers the adjacent territory in B2B Displacement Campaigns: Win Competitor Customers, which works the same problem from the account strategy side.
Frequently asked questions
Is the identity bridge only a Microsoft problem?
No. Microsoft environments make it most visible because Entra Connect and AD FS are widely deployed and well documented. Any organization that synchronizes or federates identity between an on-premises directory and a cloud provider carries the same structural exposure, including those running third-party identity providers alongside a legacy directory.
Does multifactor authentication protect against Golden SAML?
No. Golden SAML forges the authentication assertion itself, so the authentication event never occurs in a form that MFA or Conditional Access can evaluate. Protecting against it requires securing the federation infrastructure, controlling and monitoring token-signing certificates, and auditing certificate export and configuration changes.
How should an organization prioritize the identity bridge against other security work?
Prioritize it by blast radius rather than by likelihood. Most security findings expose one system. A compromised synchronization or federation server exposes every synchronized identity across both environments simultaneously, which places it in the same category as a domain controller.
What is the first question a security leader should ask about hybrid identity?
Ask who administers the synchronization and federation servers, and whether those administrators use the same accounts and workstations they use for ordinary IT work. The answer reveals whether the organization treats the bridge as a Control Plane asset in practice or only in documentation.
Did identity risk actually decline in 2026?
The 2026 Verizon DBIR showed credential abuse falling as an initial access vector, partly because a new pretexting category absorbed some incidents previously counted as credential abuse. Across the full breach chain, credential abuse still appeared in 39 percent of breaches. Attackers changed how they get in more than they changed what they do afterward.
The work is a translation problem
The identity bridge deserves attention on its technical merits, and the vendor documentation, the threat research, and the incident history all say so clearly. None of that has been enough on its own, which tells us something worth taking seriously.
Security programs do not fail only because teams miss the risk. They fail because the people who see the risk most clearly describe it in a language the people holding the budget do not speak. That is a solvable problem, and solving it does not require anyone to dilute the technical truth. It requires naming consequences, attaching risk to priorities the organization already values, and asking for a first step small enough to approve.
About the Author
Navneet Lounsberry brings over two decades of enterprise sales and business development experience across IBM, SAP, Manhattan Associates, UKG, and Idenhaus Consulting, where her work spanned identity and access management and cybersecurity compliance, including CMMC. A Georgia Tech graduate, she writes about how enterprise buyers in regulated industries actually evaluate, procure, and operate compliance programs.
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